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A growing and deepening divide has opened up between transition
countries where economic development has taken off and those
caught in a vicious cycle of institutional backwardness and
macroeconomic instability. This "Great Divide" is visible in
almost every measure of economic performance: GDP growth,
investment, government finances, growth in inequality, general
institutional infrastructure, and increasingly in measures of
financial development. Strategies for financial development have
differed dramatically across countries and over time, offering
interesting opportunities to study the links between real and
financial sector development.
Even in the countries that have made it across the divide like
The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and the Baltic
states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, a remarkable diversity of
policies for financial development has been pursued. Yet,
strikingly, today the basic financial architectures of these
frontrunners are remarkably similar. These financial systems are
strongly dominated by commercial banks, increasingly foreign
owned, which lend primarily to government. Stock markets are
highly volatile and illiquid, and their sustainability is in
question as the numbers of listed firms are stagnating or even
falling. Enterprises rely primarily on internally generated funds,
and the bulk of external long-term finance comes from foreign
direct investment.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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The Great Divide in economic and financial development and the
convergence in financial architecture among the successful
countries raise fundamental questions about how financial
development interacts with economic growth. Is it possible to
engineer a development take-off by creating a modern financial
architecture from scratch? Or are financial institutions and
markets a reflection of underlying conditions in the real sector?
Or are both financial development and economic growth driven by
some other underlying variables? Is it possible to leapfrog
certain stages of financial development or must all countries go
through a phase of bank-oriented financial architecture? The
experience of the transition economies represents a unique
opportunity to shed new light on these issues.
We start by describing the salient features of financial
transition. We will argue that financial development does not
explain why a small group of countries developed and grew while
the majority of transition economies remained mired in economic
stagnation. In general, the financial sector has played a small
role in the restructuring of the manufacturing sector in
transition economies, and in some cases financial liberalization
may have undermined real sector development. We argue that the
ability of governments of transition economies to achieve fiscal
and monetary responsibility, together with a commitment to refrain
from excessively bailing out failing banks or loss-making
enterprises, determined whether economic and financial developmentWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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took off. Fiscal responsibility promotes both financial
development and economic growth through two important channels:
it limits the extent of crowding out of private investment by
government borrowing and it makes it credible that the government
will be able to maintain the macro stability that is essential
for private investment. In addition, it provides some guarantees
that the returns from investment are not going to be taxed away
in the future by excessively profligate governments desperately
seeking tax revenues where they can find them. Of course,
specific initial conditions and underlying country
characteristics facilitate the emergence of fiscally sound
governments capable of enforcing the rule of law. We discuss what
these conditions might be.
The Evolution of Banking and the Emergence of the Great Divide
All banking systems in transition economies have evolved from a
single institution, the monobank, which was responsible for both
monetary policy and commercial banking. In the monobank system,
the overall level of credit was often quite high, with the aim of
spurring production along the lines desired by the economic
planners, rather than having loans channeled according to
conventional standards of creditworthiness. The monobank was thus
not a bank in the sense that it screened and monitored projects or
enforced repayment of loans, rather it was the channel for funds
allocated by the plan. Since the planned economy repressed or hidWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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inflation with price ceilings and guaranteed jobs for all, at
least nominally, the standard counter cyclical tasks of central
banking were not especially relevant to the monobank.
The financial sector transition from a planned economy to a
market-oriented economy involved transforming the monobank into a
decentralized financial system integrated into a market economy.
Most Soviet-bloc countries started this process by implementing
more or less the same measures: by separating the central and
commercial banking activities of the monobank and by breaking up
the commercial banking activities into multiple smaller units.
Most countries also allowed for entry of new banks.
In parallel, other important reforms were implemented, in
particular price liberalization. A few countries got a head start
in separating out these two functions and creating a two-tier
banking system. The first was Yugoslavia during the 1960s. In the
mid-1980s a few other socialist economies followed, Hungary in a
more controlled way than the Soviet Union and Poland (Sgard,
1996).
The separation of central and commercial banking brought with it
some rudiments of monetary policy, like credit ceilings and
refinancing windows. However, central banks had weak incentives to
conduct price-stabilizing monetary policy and relatively little
power to regulate the commercial banks. Central banks generally
attracted highly talented people, but they were often politically
weak. The extent of their independence from political influence
varied greatly, and actual independence was often less thanWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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suggested by formal rules. Moreover, independence from the
government did not always protect against influence activities by
other lobbying interests.1
The new commercial banks formed from the break-up of the
monobank faced difficult prospects. For a time, they were little
more than an accounting construction and were run by segments of
the old bureaucratic network and staff. Their inherited balance
sheets included household deposits, loans from the central bank,
and a portfolio of enterprise credits of unknown quality. Bank
managers had little genuine banking experience, a generally low
quality of assets, and little guidance from the poorly developed
system of bank regulation. In addition, most of the newly created
banks remained under state ownership and their business clients
had yet to be privatized, so lending policies were not based on
any financial or economic logic. Instead, non-performing loans
losses were automatically rolled over, often with additional loans
provided by the central bank (that is, by printing money). As a
number of analysts had expected, lax lending practices to state-
owned industry became an important source of inflationary pressure
during the early phase of transition.
                        
1 An interesting anomaly is the Central Bank of Russia which has
far-reaching independence, but where the governor is also a
cabinet member. For much of the 1990’s Viktor Gerashenko,
originally the head of the monobank Gosbank, occupied this
position. During his first tenure under the Yeltsin presidency he
systematically undermined the government’s attempt to stabilize
the economy by increasing the money supply to bail out ailing
banks and firms. In his second tenure after the crisis of 1998 he
has pursued a more strict monetary policy, but he also gave in to
intense lobbying not to liquidate and restructure the defunct
banking sector. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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These fledgling commercial banks were also operating in a
difficult macroeconomic situation. Most Eastern European economies
inherited a massive "monetary overhang": that is, household
savings in deposit accounts that had accumulated as a result of
the pervasive shortages of consumption goods and distortionary
price controls under central planning. Following price
liberalization, this money flowed into the economy and the
monetary overhang turned into open inflation. Firms responded to
this accelerating inflation with widespread hoarding of goods and
by increasingly relying on barter arrangements, even among large
businesses. Thus, just at the time when money and credit should
have become more central to economic organization and
transactions, the new banks found themselves in a macroeconomic
environment where rapid disintermediation was occurring.
The first test of the institutional strength of this new
constellation of commercial banks came in the early 1990s when
central banks made an attempt to control monetary growth, which
sharply reduced real credit and created a severe credit crunch
(Calvo and Coricelli, 1995). In all transition countries, the
initial response to the monetary tightening by enterprises was
inertia; they reacted to the lower level of credit with mounting
unpaid bills to suppliers and in some cases to workers. Some
countries, however - mostly in central Europe and in the Baltic
states - gradually managed to resist the pressures to bail out
banks and enterprises. After the initial pain of the credit crunch
and several banking crises, the eventual outcome in theseWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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countries was a stable monetary and fiscal policy. Some of these
countries, e.g. Estonia, went as far as locking in monetary
stability through a currency board arrangement. This in turn laid
the foundation for a virtuous spiral of microeconomic
restructuring and macroeconomic consolidation. These countries
managed to gradually re-orient their productive sector and
integrate it with world trade, thus restarting the growth process
early on. 
In other transition countries, including most of the former
Soviet Union as well as countries in southeast Europe, like
Bulgaria and Romania, authorities did not, or could not, resist
the pressures for financial relief. Central banks, after only a
few months of attempted stabilization, provided additional loans
to commercial banks and monetized the rapidly increasing stocks of
credit. This pattern of repeated bailouts for both banks and
businesses led to a lack of enterprise restructuring, weaker
banks, and the need for more inflationary credit bail-outs2. As a
result these countries have experienced a much more protracted
slump than might otherwise have been the case. The Great Divide
had opened up.
Measuring Financial Development
                        
2 A recent positive development which goes against this sharp
characterization is the adoption of a currency board by Bulgaria
which has provided some welcome monetary stability. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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Data limitations are a serious constraint for analyzing the
interaction between economic and financial development in
transition economies. Standard measures of financial development
include the assets of financial institutions, the amount of money
in circulation, and loans to households and enterprises. 
However, in the early phases of economic transition GDP
statistics are of dubious quality. The very high levels of
inflation during this period in most countries resulted in large
nominal GDP figures and measures of credit as a share of GDP do
not adequately correct for inflation in the early years as initial
credit measures were mainly accounting fictions, which did not
reflect inflationary expectations. In addition, above average
lending flows to enterprises may have been a symptom of weakness,
or softness, rather than a reflection of above average financial
development.3 
With these cautions duly noted, Table 1 shows the development of
domestic credit to the private sector as a share of GDP during the
period 1994-1999 (unfortunately, data for the earlier years of
transition is only available in a few countries).    Taking  this
measure at face value, only Estonia, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia
saw relatively steady expansion of credit. These countries are
also grouped as having crossed the Great Divide, but they are not
alone in having done so. The Czech Republic had very high levels
                        
3 Another issue of mismeasurement arises with privatizations.
Table 2 typically excludes state-owned enterprises, so that
privatization of firms with bank credits is registered as
financial development even though nothing has actually changed in
terms of the amount of credit extended.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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of credit already, which reflect the mass privatization of
enterprises and extensive bad loans, and thus exaggerate its
relative financial development. Hungary had four severe banking
crises in four years during the first half of the 1990s resulting
in a sharp drop in credit from 45 percent of GDP in 1990 to 24.7
in 1994. But since then its level of credit has expanded in step
with economic growth. Similarly, Latvia and Lithuania first
experienced banking crises in the mid-1990s which reduced the
ratio of credit to GDP, followed by a recovery. It is important to
stress that in all these countries the real impact of these
financial crises was moderate. Most of the problems stemmed from
bad stocks rather than flows, and banks had mainly been lending to
government and less to households and enterprises.4 To summarize,
the experience of financial transition in the most successful
group of countries provides weak evidence at best of a link
between financial development and growth.
The correlation between financial development and economic
growth is even weaker in the other countries. Bulgaria experienced
rapid growth in credit in the mid-1990s and then a drastic fall in
the late 1990s, but its economy declined or showed moderate growth
over this time period. In Russia, financial markets developed
rapidly and credit to households and enterprises increased
somewhat in the late 1990s, while the economy continued to
                        
4 A footnote on the Baltic countries may be warranted here. These
countries still have lower levels of economic wealth due to lower
starting points and deeper and more protracted initial declines.
But their institutional development has proceeded much faster
than other CIS countries and on par with the lead reformers inWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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stagnate. The financial crisis in August 1998 had little long-
term impact on real growth. Some observers even argue that the
crisis had a positive effect on economic development by cutting
to size some of the interests blocking reform. While there was a
slight fall in credit the economy subsequently grew rapidly.
Ukraine, and many other countries that were formerly part of the
Soviet Union, saw neither financial development nor economic
growth. In sum, the link between financial development and
economic growth does not appear to be very strong during the first
decade of transition, at least when one looks at the ratio of
domestic credit to GDP.
On the other hand the differences in development stand out more
in measures of financial reform (EBRD, 2000) and general
institutional quality such as "law on the books" and "law
enforcement" indices (Pistor et al., 2000; and Kaufmann et al.,
2000). While most of the transition countries have adopted
increasingly sophisticated legal and regulatory frameworks in the
financial area, implementation and enforcement is significantly
better in countries on the right side of the divide. Table 2 gives
an index of banking reforms, and Table 3 an index of reforms of
non-banking financial institutions. All these measures of
institutional quality inevitably involve a considerable degree of
judgment and should be interpreted with care. Nevertheless, they
do highlight the Great Divide; they have also been good predictors
of vulnerability during the Asian crisis of 1997-1998 (Johnson et
                                                                 
Central and Eastern Europe (see Tables 2 and 3).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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al., 2000). Obviously, the interesting underlying question is what
explains these differences in institutional quality.
Beyond the Great Divide: Different Policies and Systemic
Convergence of Financial Architecture
   The transition experience does not reveal a single magic policy
formula guaranteeing a successful path for financial and economic
development. Among the countries that have failed to bridge the
Great Divide, a variety of policies have been tried, and several
varieties of dysfunctional financial systems have emerged. In
Russia and the Ukraine, most commercial banks are in private
hands, but most of these banks are insolvent and should be closed
down. Financial institutions and markets in these two countries
were severely hit by the financial crisis in 1998. Also, in these
countries corruption, crime and cronyism undermine enforcement of
the legal and regulatory framework. Also, political resistance
towards further reforms remains strong. A second group of less
successful transition countries, including Bulgaria, Romania and
Slovakia have only made partial attempts to reform. The largest
banks in these countries are still predominantly state-owned. In
addition, the presence of a large number of insolvent banks
undermines competition. While the regulatory environment is
improving enforcement remains weak.
In the more successful countries in Central and Eastern Europe
financial architecture is converging despite major differences inWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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policies pursued. After an early boost in stock market activity in
the aftermath of mass privatization and different policy responses
to the banking crises following price liberalization, bank-based
financial systems are emerging. Some examples of these policy
differences include: procedures for restructuring bad loans,
privatization strategies for enterprises and banks, policy towards
foreign entry in the banking sector, regulatory barriers to entry
of new banks, and policies toward stock market development.
The approach to cleaning up bank balance sheets has also been
very different across transition countries. Both the extent to
which banks were induced to stop rolling over bad debts to
enterprises and the methods used to recapitalize banks varied
widely across transition countries. Some countries, like the Czech
Republic, transferred bad debts to specialized “hospital” banks,
while others, like Poland, chose to clean up balance sheets within
existing institutions.
In an attempt to encourage banks to stop rolling over their bad
debts and to deal with the growing problem of payment delays
Hungary adopted a devastatingly effective bankruptcy law. It had
an automatic trigger which more or less overnight forced much of
Hungary's industry into court-led bankruptcy procedures. The sheer
number of cases paralyzed Hungary's courts. Mitchell (1993)
characterized it as a "too many to fail" situation. Inevitably
Hungary had to quickly water down its new bankruptcy law and
remove the automatic trigger. In a similar attempt the Czech
Republic adopted a bankruptcy code just after its massWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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privatization program, but suspended its application for two years
in response to political pressure from many unprofitable state-
owned and privatized firms. Once the Czech bankruptcy law came
into force it led to a wave of takeovers of smaller, not
necessarily less efficient, firms by large politically connected
firms. In a more pragmatic approach Poland opted for informal
workouts outside courts under a moratorium on bankruptcy, with the
government offering to give up the seniority of its tax claims to
provide incentives for banks and firms to agree to restructure
their bad loans.
Countries in transition also opted for very different strategies
for privatizing state-owned enterprises. These differences are
broad even if one focuses only on those countries that
successfully crossed the Great Divide. For example, Hungary
started privatization early and followed a case-by-case sales
method, while the Czech Republic opted for a mass voucher
privatization scheme. A small group of investment funds (tied to
large banks) controlling most privatized assets emerged from this
mass voucher privatization following the repurchase of most
dispersed vouchers from households. Poland dragged its feet in
implementing mass privatization, out of a concern that the legal
and supervisory environment be strengthened first, but then
proceeded with privatizing a number of individual firms through
management buyouts and liquidation schemes.
Bank privatization also followed quite different paths. The
Czech Republic included banks in the first wave of voucherWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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privatization. Poland combined management buyouts, some public
offerings and smaller placements with foreign strategic investors.
Bank privatization accelerated across central Europe in the second
half of the 1990s, but governments often retained strategic
stakes. Despite these different privatization strategies, all of
these countries ended up with similar bank-based financial systems
a decade later. The countries on the “wrong” side of the Great
Divide generally have higher shares of banking assets controlled
by the state (the Ukraine being an exception).
It was not until foreign banks were allowed to acquire strategic
stakes in the domestic banking sectors that private ownership took
a firm hold in the banking sector of most countries. By now,
several countries have high foreign ownership shares. Hungary was
the first country to allow widespread foreign penetration in the
banking sector. Foreigners now control more than 40 percent of
shares in Hungarian banks, accounting for as much as 80 percent of
assets (Abel and Bonin, 2001). The Baltic states of Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania also have very high shares of foreign
ownership, primarily from banks based in Scandinavian countries.
Poland initially took a positive stance towards foreign ownership
of banks, then backtracked, before opening the banking sector
again to foreign ownership. The Czech government was initially
resistant to foreign ownership of banks, but several large bank
failures finally opened up ownership to foreign institutions.
Today the shares of foreign ownership of banks in Poland and the
Czech Republic are 52.8 and 50.7 percent, respectively. In theWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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countries on the “wrong” side of the Great Divide the presence of
foreign banks, as well as other foreign direct investment is much
more limited partly by design and partly by default.
Understandably, foreign banks have been reluctant to buy stakes in
weak institutions.
Most transition countries experienced significant entry of new
banks following financial liberalization and the separation of
monetary policy and commercial banking (Tang, 1999). In the Baltic
states and in Russia the number of registered banks increased
dramatically in the early years of transition. This wave of new
entrants imposed a heavy supervisory burden on central banks with
little experience in the task. Most new entrants were small and
closely tied to newly privatized enterprises. Most of them quickly
became insolvent. Some countries, in particular Romania and
Albania but also Russia, even witnessed devastating episodes of
frenzied speculation around a small number of unscrupulous banks,
which started unsustainable pyramid or Ponzi schemes drawing in
thousands of inexperienced and gullible households. The inevitable
failure of these banks led to severe financial crises and
seriously undermined confidence in banking institutions in these
countries.
In contrast, in countries of central and eastern Europe new bank
entry has been on a much smaller scale. There has been a moderate
increase in the number of banks in Hungary. The number of banks
rose somewhat, then fell again in the Czech Republic, declined
slightly in Poland, and fell sharply in Bulgaria. The number ofWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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banks has shrunk following several banking crises and more
consolidation is underway. Foreign-owned banks and banks with
stronger capital-asset ratios are growing more rapidly than other
banks. On the other hand larger, more dominant institutions are
expanding more slowly (Fries and Taci, 2001). Privatized and new
private banks have grown at about the same rate as state-owned
banks. On the whole, however, the growth of bank loans has not
kept pace with real sector growth.    
Table 4 provides some data on the banking industry and the
official numbers of bad loans, including countries on both sides
of the Great Divide. The first column highlights that despite new
entry the banking sector is heavily dominated by the three largest
banks in most countries. These banks are not only able to exert
monopoly power in deposit and lending activities, but also often
yield considerable political influence. The fourth column shows
the worst performers in terms of cleaning up bank balance sheets.
The Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia had a bad-loans-to-total-
loans ratio between 30 and 40% in 1999. This compares with a
reported ratio of 7.8 for Italy, 1.4 for Japan and 0.7 for the US
in 1998.5 The fifth column gives figures for bank spreads. The
lower the spread the better is the banking sector and the legal
protection of creditors, other things equal. Indeed, high spreads
                        
5 Anyone vaguely familiar with the current situation in the
Japanese banking system may question the reliability of these
numbers. The uncertainty should be even greater in the countries
of Central and Eastern Europe, in particular in the countries on
the “wrong” side of the Great Divide where regulatory powers are
weaker and the incentives to hide bad loans stronger.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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reflect higher banking costs, greater monopoly power and greater
lending risks.
As hinted at before, many countries pursued a policy of stock
market development in the early stages of transition (Claessens,
Djankov and Klingebiel, 2000). One group of countries -- including
the Czech and Slovak Republics, Lithuania and Romania -- made
heavy use of stock markets to transfer ownership through mass
privatization. The number of firms listed on these stock exchanges
increased dramatically, but after an initial phase of high trade
volumes, most stocks became and remained illiquid. Over time, many
companies have been delisted, and the number of shareholders fell
as ownership became increasingly concentrated. Table 5 shows the
pattern of flat or declining numbers of companies listed on stock
markets in a selection of transition economies. Regulation of
stock exchanges was minimal. In the Czech Republic, a formal
regulator was not even established. 
A second group of countries - including Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Poland and Slovenia - developed their stock exchanges
mainly through a small number of initial public offerings. Trading
in most of these shares remained relatively high. A third group of
countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union, including
Russia and the Ukraine, developed stock markets through both
privatization and initial public offerings. All these countries
had mass privatizations, but the exchange of vouchers took place
outside the official stock markets. Six transition countries -
Albania, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Tajikistan, andWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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Turkmenistan - never established stock markets.
Despite these marked differences in policies with regard to
financial architecture, it is a remarkable fact that the financial
systems in the more advanced transition countries have converged
and now share three key features.
First, the financial sector of the successful transition
economies is strongly dominated by banks, which lend primarily to
governments and other financial institutions. Banks provide some
working capital finance to the corporate sector, but so far have
played a limited role in financing investments. Investment finance
comes almost exclusively from retained earnings, and most external
finance comes through foreign direct investment (IMF, 2000).
Second, ownership structures in individual firms are
concentrated and turnover of shares is low. Only the stock markets
in Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland and Hungary have
capitalization-to-GDP ratios comparable to other emerging markets
(23, 37, 36, and 20 per cent, respectively). But most exchanges
are very illiquid with trade concentrated in a small number of
firms (Claessens, Djankov and Klingebiel, 2000). The number of
listed firms has decreased as a result of foreign acquisitions,
domestic mergers and delisting. The best firms show limited
interest in listing on local exchanges, preferring instead the
quality stamp and liquidity of the international stock markets in
Europe and the United States. At the end of 1999, 72 corporations
from transition economies were listed on the New York Stock
Exchange or Nasdaq, and companies listed in Germany accounted forWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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most of domestic market capitalization in Hungary and the Czech
Republic. Turnover is, however, still mostly concentrated to local
exchanges. The long-term sustainability of some of these exchanges
are nevertheless in doubt, given the growing integration of
financial markets in Europe and the world.
Third, bank spreads -- that is, the difference between lending
and borrowing rates --have declined significantly in level and
volatility in most countries of central and eastern Eureope.
Nevertheless they remain high by the standards of developed market
economies (see Table 4); corresponding levels for the US and
Sweden in 1999 were 2.7 and 3.9 per cent, respectively.
To summarize, the countries that find themselves on the
prospering side of the Great Divide have now established the basic
structure of their financial systems. They all have converged to
mainly bank-based financial systems, with a significant fraction
of foreign bank ownership. Local equity markets have gradually
declined and have been overshadowed by European or U.S. stock
exchanges. Important vulnerabilities, however, remain and some of
the countries still require major, potentially difficult, reforms.
The countries on the “wrong” side of the Great Divide also have
financial systems dominated by banks, but the portfolios of these
institutions are in a much worse state and the regulatory
environment significantly weaker. As a result, budget constraints
of banks and ultimately of governments are more likely to be soft.
Stock markets are even less developed. Much of the difficult work
of financial development still remains, and most of theseWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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countries will only have limited help from the accession process
to the European Union, the process that has been so important for
the front-runners in Central and Eastern Europe.
Financial Transition and Financial Development: Different Starting
Points and Moving Targets
Transition is a unique historical event and there are limits to
the generality of the lessons that can be drawn from the
experience for financial development. As the preceding brief
overview of a decade of financial transition highlights, these
countries started out with fundamentally imbalanced financial
systems supported by powerful institutions. It was inevitable that
any development would have to be preceded by an elimination of the
monetary overhang and a protracted institutional breakdown. In
some cases this breakdown is not yet complete, whereas in others
old institutions effectively lost their role within a few years.
On the other hand, many developing countries also have grossly
distorted financial systems often with extensive state
intervention or “crony captalism” requiring wide-ranging
institutional transformation. In the end the differences between
the issues raised in the financial development literature and
those of financial transition must be more a matter of degree than
of qualitative distinctions. 
In particular, the transition experience can shed new light on
the difficult question of whether financial development can beWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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engineered to create a financial infrastructure enhancing economic
growth. Certainly initial hopes were high that a financial
infrastructure could be created to help transition economies
leapfrog stages of development. Partly these hopes were based on
the first findings of the emerging financial development
literature linking financial development to subsequent growth
experience. From a technological point of view, some leapfrogging
has taken place. For example, ATM machines are widely available in
most countries in Central and Eastern Europe and in many CIS
countries, and some front-runner countries have high penetration
of internet banking. But when it comes to basic institutions of
finance these hopes appear to have been unrealistic.
Financial Development and Economic Growth
A number of empirical studies based on cross-country regressions
have found that financial development at any given point in time -
as measured by the ratio of bank lending to GDP, and/or the ratio
of stock market turnover to GDP -- is positively correlated with
future per capita economic growth (for example, King and Levine,
1993a, b; Levine and Zervos, 1998). The conclusion generally drawn
from these studies is that "well-functioning financial
intermediaries and markets promote long-run economic growth"
(Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001, p. 1). The implied
prescription for transition economies is to focus on financial
reform as one of the ways to achieve economic growth.
Another set of empirical studies have found a statisticalWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
22
relation between legal investor protection and financial
development. These studies have used a country's legal origin as
an instrument for resolving the vexing endogeneity question of the
interaction between legal protection of investors and investment
flows to the corporate sector. Legal origin is typically
categorized according to common law vs. civil law traditions
and/or English versus French, German or Scandinavian legal
traditions. The theory is that common law traditions are more
investor friendly and since legal tradition clearly predates
investment flows to corporations following the industrial
revolution a clear causal link can be established between the
degree of investor protection and the size of outside investment
funds to corporations. A common finding of these studies is that
countries with a French legal tradition tend to be less
financially developed (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and
Vishny 1997, 1998; Levine, 2000; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine,
2001).
The policy implications from these contributions are less clear
as legal traditions are not easy to change. But the findings
suggest a link between a country's legal infrastructure
(specifically the degree of legal investor protections) and
financial development. Indeed, looking beyond legal origin, these
studies also find a direct positive relation between financial
development and various indices of investor protection (LaPorta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1997, 1998). Other studies
find a positive relation between per capita income and variousWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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indices of investor protection (Levine 2000; Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson, 2000). Most intriguingly, these studies also suggest
that legal origin has persistent long-run effects on financial
development.
A general difficulty in applying the literature on legal origin
and financial development to transition economies is that there is
little variation in legal origin, most countries having a civil
law tradition. In addition, most countries have adopted civil-law-
type institutions in order to facilitate EU accession. One
exception is Russia, which has had a brief but unfortunate
experiment in a common law approach to corporate law.
More importantly, the view that legal origin has persistent
effects on financial development, however, is difficult to
reconcile with the observation of Rajan and Zingales (2000) that
financial development in 1913 was significantly higher in France
than in the United States -- apparently the French legal system
was not holding back investment flows to corporations at that
time. Rajan and Zingales also observe that around the world,
financial development peaked before World War I, then declined
until well after World War II, before growing back to a new peak
at the turn of the twenty-first century. This financial history
suggests that other important factors affect financial development
besides legal origin and investor protection. 
What might these factors be? Rajan and Zingales invoke the
political power of incumbents. They propose that insiders,
primarily incumbent managers or owners and labor unions, areWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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inherently opposed to financial development, as it would bring
about greater competition from new entrants. In times of crisis or
conflict these insiders gain more political influence and are able
to push through legislation protecting their interests and
inhibiting the growth of financial markets. With greater
prosperity, however, these interest groups lose their grip on
political power, so that eventually new legislation is passed
fostering the development of financial markets. Although this
story could explain the U-shaped pattern of financial development
of advanced economies in the twentieth century, a deeper analysis
is clearly required before one can say with any confidence whether
financial development is mainly driven by such a political
struggle between insiders and outsiders. Also, Mancur Olson (1982)
has convincingly argued in another context the opposite story that
insiders become entrenched in good times, and recessions serve to
break their hold on critical institutions. Why his story would not
apply to financial development remains an open question.
Interestingly, insider control has also been singled out to be
the key governance problem in transition. Privatization in most
countries resulted in a transfer of control to incumbent
management and in some cases to workers. While many firms were
looted by their managers initially, they have later tried to find
ways to commit not to expropriate investors. However, without
effective bonding devices or mechanisms to transfer control to
investors, firms have been confined to defensive cost-cutting
measures and growth based on internally generated funds.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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Other factors relevant to transition that could also explain the
observed pattern of financial development around the world are:
i) the stock-market crash in 1929, the ensuing banking crises and
the general loss of confidence in financial markets and
institutions, similar to the experience of many transition
countries;
ii) the rise of the welfare state following the onset of the great
depression and World War II, which has had the important effect of
removing retirement savings from capital markets. It is only in
the 1980s that contribution-based retirement plans have been
introduced (mainly in the United States and the United Kingdom).
These plans have had a major impact on the growth of the private
pension fund industry and on the growth of securities markets in
the last two decades. Similar if more limited reforms are also
underway in some of the more advanced transition countries, and
this should help financial sector development, in particular the
growth of securities markets. It is, however, still an open
question whether these commitments to privately funded schemes are
credible in countries where large segments of the population may
end up with very low retirement benefits;
iii) the growth of the public sector in response to the great
depression, the war production effort and, nationalizations
following World War II (in the UK, France and Italy). A larger
public sector meant that a smaller fraction of corporate
investments required funding from private sources, thus limiting
the extent of the private sector. Again, it is only since theWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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beginning of the 1980’s that the public sector has been scaled
back through large-scale privatization programs (Bortolotti,
Fantini and Siniscalco, 2001): It is still an open question what
size of public sector the transition countries will eventually aim
for, but the choice couldhave important ramifications for
financial development;
iv) the growth of government debt and the resulting rise in long-
term interest rates, which have discouraged private investment.
This factor is of particular importance for some transition
economies, where extremely high yields on government bonds have
discouraged bank lending to the private sector. One piece of
evidence consistent with this view is the growth in private
lending witnessed in Russia following the default on government
bonds in 1998 (see for example, Huang, Marin and Xu, 2001).
       
Bank-based versus Financial Market-based Systems
Most developing economies have bank-based financial systems and
financial markets play a relatively minor role. It is only at more
advanced stages of development that one sees financial markets,
including stock and bond markets, play an increasingly important
role. Various explanations have been given for this pattern.
One influential view is that when accounting rules and, more
generally, regulatory and contractual enforcement institutions are
weak, banks are better placed to protect creditor rights
(Gerschenkron, 1962; Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Small investors
are deterred from investing in the stock market for fear of beingWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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exploited by unscrupulous stock price manipulators and insider
traders.  They feel that their savings are better protected in
deposit or savings accounts at banks, which are generally subject
to some form of supervision by the state.
On the corporate side, most firms are too small and risky at
early stages of development to be able to issue shares or bonds on
an organized exchange at a competitive cost of capital. Only the
more advanced economies have a sufficient number of large and
stable firms that could get cheaper funds by issuing securities
and thus create the thick market externalities necessary to
sustain efficient stock markets (Pagano, 1993). Stock markets also
tend to develop when there is a culture of equity investment and
private pension plans, over and above regulatory protections to
limit price manipulation and fraud. Finally, stock markets require
well-trained professionals, market makers, traders, fund managers,
and financial regulators, none of which were present at the
beginning of transition.
A casual look at financial architecture in developing countries
suggests that as the real economy develops, there is a gradual
shift from bank-based to market-based corporate finance, but the
empirical literature exploring the link between bank-based or
market-based financial systems and per capita growth produces
mixed evidence. Several studies have found that greater financial
intermediation is associated with greater future growth (King and
Levine, 1993a, b) and that stock market development is also
positively related with future growth (Levine and Zervos, 1998).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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More recently, Tadasse (2000) has refined these findings by
highlighting that for the less financially developed countries a
greater emphasis on financial intermediation is positively
correlated with future growth, while for the more developed
countries there is a negative correlation between financial
intermediation and growth. On the other hand, Levine (2000) finds
that the relative weight of bank versus market finance is not
significantly related to economic growth in cross country
regressions once legal protection is introduced as an additional
factor.
The transition experience lends some support to the notion that
bank-led finance may be inevitable at certain stages of
development and that efforts to develop stock exchanges in some
countries may have been premature. On the other hand the evidence
of a link between bank-based development and economic growth is
weak. As we have already highlighted the monetary, fiscal and
regulatory environment under which financial institutions and
markets had to operate appears to have been as or more important
in facilitating both financial and economic development.
Financial Development, Inequality and Instability
While exploring the link between legal infrastructure, investor
protection and aggregate investment, some researchers have argued
that the legal infrastructure and the extent of investor
protection are proxies of broader underlying countryWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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characteristics like wealth inequalities, political polarization
and macro-instability. For example, Perotti (1996) found that the
risk of expropriation of investors is related to political
polarization and conflict, which itself is linked to wealth
inequalities. Similarly, several empirical studies surveyed in
Benabou (1996) have found that protection of property rights is
weakened when there is greater income inequality and that greater
political instability tends to decrease investment and growth.
Also, in a study of financial development in Latin American
countries, Padilla and Requejo (2000) have found that
macroeconomic stability is a more important factor determining
development of lending to the corporate sector than creditor
protection.
A systematic analysis for transition countries exploring the
link between property rights protection and underlying factors
such as political polarization, wealth inequalities and macro-
instability remains to be undertaken. However, consistent with the
findings of Perotti (1996) and others is the dramatic rise in
inequality and poverty rates witnessed by some countries on the
wrong side of the great divide with particularly weak property
rights enforcement like Russia, Romania and the Ukraine. Most
transition countries started out with low income inequality as
measured by the Gini coefficient, which was around 0.2 on average
at the beginning of transition (cf. Sweden and United States at
the time with 0.25 and 0.40, respectively). All of the transition
countries have subsequently seen income inequalities riseWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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significantly. But the CIS countries experienced much more
dramatic increases with Ukraine and Russia now having extremely
skewed income distributions (see Figure 1).
Explaining the Great Divide and Systemic Convergence
The emergence of the Great Divide illustrates how difficult it
is to implement sustainable financial development and how much
underlying country characteristics matter. Indeed, the reason why
some countries were able to cross the Great Divide while others
did not must be sought to a large extent outside the financial and
legal system per se.
As we have argued, one leading explanation for the observed
variation in financial and economic development across transition
countries can be found in the differences in fiscal and monetary
discipline and the enforcement capacity of governments. Without
fiscal and monetary discipline government borrowing crowds out or
discourages investment in the private sector and increases
macroeconomic uncertainty (for some recent evidence, see Fries and
Taci, 2001).
As pertinent as this diagnosis may be it is not all that helpful
if one does not also identify why some countries tend to have
fiscally irresponsible governments but not others. What determines
whether a government will be able to show fiscal and monetary
restraint? To address this question we must return to the
situation facing transition countries in the wake of transition,William Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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when the first step towards financial development had been taken
by breaking up the monobank and ending central economic planning.
One heritage of the Soviet past was that governments were locked
into financial relationships with a large number of firms facing
daunting restructuring tasks. The pressure to keep many loss-
making firms afloat through subsidies was tremendous.
One reason why some countries ended up on the wrong side of the
Great Divide was that political and economic costs of resisting
calls for bailouts were too great. To appreciate the challenge
facing some of these countries, particularly those that were part
of the Soviet Union, one must look back even further to the Soviet
system of production (Berliner, 1976; Kornai, 1992). This system
typically involved production on a very large scale, with in many
cases only one firm producing or assembling a particular good. It
was partly a political decision by Stalin and later Soviet leaders
to make regions overspecialized and interdependent, and thus to
increase the costs of separating a particular republic. In
addition, the Soviet economy had a disproportionately large
military-industrial sector, where the choice of geographic
location of a factory was often made for political reasons rather
than comparative advantage. The legacy of these arrangements are
visible in today's Russia in the many "one-factory-towns" and the
large population living in economically non-viable areas of the
country6. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, most newly
                        
6  In contrast, China relied much more on a strategy of regional
decentralization; for an interesting comparison of Chinese and
Russian planning see Qian and Xu (1993).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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independent States therefore inherited a highly concentrated and
often also an economically nonviable industrial base, which they
had little choice but to keep afloat at least in the short run.
Another factor that affected why some governments were able to
impose fiscal and monetary discipline and others not is the
coordination of enterprises' lobbying efforts for more subsidies
and bailouts (Perotti, 1998). In many countries, more or less
formalized groups of financial and industrial firms have formed,
partly because they were previously connected to the same
administrative structure. These groups made it easier for their
members to extract benefits from government. Several studies in
Russia have shown that such groups were able to relieve credit
constraints of individual member firms (Perotti and Gelfer, 2001;
Volchkova, 2000). But they may also have served the purpose of
extracting inefficiently large resource transfers from the state.
On the other side of the budget equation, another important
factor that has affected government fiscal and monetary discipline
was its ability to raise taxes and other revenues. Several
countries that have made it across the Great Divide have been able
to raise significant revenues through privatization of state
assets. But perhaps a more important common denominator of these
countries is the considerable legitimacy of their new
democratically elected governments. These countries have also had
some experience with democracy before World War II and have
generally a greater respect for "the rule of law”.  These factors
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are obviously of critical importance in limiting tax evasion and
in facilitating the enforcement of existing rules and regulations.
As Pistor et al. (2000) have pointed out, an important obstacle
towards greater financial development is the lack of enforcement
of existing laws, rather than the existence of an inadequate legal
framework.
Conversely, for the countries on the wrong side of the Great
Divide, one of the main handicaps inherited from the communist
past has been the lack of legitimacy of the state combined with
the lack of experience with democratic government. Within the
countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union, only the
Baltic states have had a relatively recent experience with
democracy. In central and eastern Europe, Bulgaria and Romania
have had virtually no experience with democracy even if they did
not live under communism for as long as the Soviet Union.
The ability of governments to implement fiscal and monetary
restraint has also undoubtedly been influenced by the country's
geographical proximity and likelihood of accession to the European
Union. When countries are located close to markets with large and
rich populations, the potential benefits from trade are greater
and restructuring appears more attractive. Prior experience of
trade with the west appears to be an important predictor of
whether enterprise restructuring has been undertaken or not. Most
of the growth in central and eastern Europe has come from new
firms or firms with extensive trade links with the west during the
communist era (Walsh and Duffy, 2000).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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The possibility of joining the European Union has also played an
important political role in advancing the reform process in much
of central and eastern Europe. The more certain and the sooner the
possibility of joining the Union, the stronger has been the
leverage of this outside anchor (Berglof and Roland, 2002).
These observations can go a long way towards explaining the
emergence of "crony capitalism" in some of the transition
countries as well as the lack of fiscal and monetary
responsibility of their governments. They also provide a
reasonably good fit for which countries made it across the Great
Divide. On the other hand, these observations are less useful for
understanding the differences in policies pursued among the group
of countries that made it across the Great Divide, or the
subsequent convergence in the systemic features of their financial
architecture.
Financial Transition: When will it end?
The task of transforming centrally planned economies into well-
functioning market economies appeared to be so simple to early
reformers that several plans have been proposed in the early days
to complete transition in less than 500 days! A decade or more
into transition it is fair to say that even the frontrunners are
far from having completed their financial transition. Even though
the basic financial architecture of a market economy is now in
place in the countries on the right side of the divide, banking
and other financial institutions do not yet perform their intendedWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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functions of channeling savings to the most productive
investments.
Another unexpected development of the past decade is that the
financial system  of advanced market economies itself has evolved
rapidly. Reformers only belatedly realized that the transition
process partly involves chasing a moving target. As the Berlin
Wall was falling deep shifts were occurring in the financial
systems of the developed market economies, with a greater role for
securities and derivatives markets, venture capital financing
followed by IPOs, and an acceleration in international financial
integration to levels not seen since the end of the nineteenth
century. With the spread of international finance, policies aimed
at developing local stock markets in transition economies became
rapidly outdated, even counterproductive. Similarly, the greater
financial integration of the European Union and the world at large
increased the desirability and sustainability of foreign banks in
transition economies.
The ongoing globalization of the financial industry raises the
issue of whether it is still meaningful to talk about national
financial systems, at least for economies that are small by global
standards. The remarkable presence of foreign commercial banks in
the transition economies in central and eastern Europe integrates
these national financial sectors into the global strategies of a
small number of large financial institutions. What is the role of
Hansabank and Unibanka, commercial banks active in the Baltic
states, in the strategies of their Swedish parent banks? To whatWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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extent can we talk about domestic financial intermediation when
external finance for investments come mostly from foreign savings?
What influence do domestic regulators and regulation in transition
economies have on the behavior of these institutions with global
reach? These are some of the new questions for financial
development posed by the current trends of world financial
integration.
What Have We Learned?
Perhaps the main lesson of the past decade of financial
transition is the importance of fiscal and monetary discipline at
the critical point when the Great Divide opens up. It appears to
have been a necessary condition for a successful financial
transition. Without fiscal discipline, private investment is
crowded out or discouraged by the looming threat of macro-
instability. Lack of fiscal discipline has also been a symptom of
other ills, like a lack of commitment to close down loss-making
firms, poor enforcement of property rights and low tax compliance.
 Countries on the wrong side of the divide have been caught in a
vicious circle of macro instability and repeated relapses in
financial development. Financial development in these countries at
best has had little effect on economic growth, and may even have
been counterproductive, by making it easier for firms to receive
credit and thereby reducing their incentive to undertake needed
restructuring.
In the countries that have crossed the Great Divide financialWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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architecture appears to have converged to a bank-based system with
substantial foreign ownership. On the positive side, the financial
sector in these countries has contributed to the hardening of
budget constraints. However, banks have not yet begun extending
significant long-term finance nor have they actively promoted
restructuring in the industrial sector.
Does this mean that Lipton and Sachs (1990, 1992) have been
right all along in focusing almost exclusively on issues of macro
stability and in neglecting the challenge of creating the
institutional foundations for a well-functioning market economy? 
 As we have argued throughout this article, it is not possible to
consider separately the macro and micro aspects of transition.
There is a basic complementarity between the macroeconomic notion
of fiscal and monetary responsibility and the microeconomic
foundations of sound financial institutions, protection of
property rights and  tax compliance. Writing new laws or
transferring them more or less wholesale from abroad is a
relatively easy task. Enforcement and the creation of functional
institutions is much more difficult. Sound government finances
create favorable conditions not only for financial development but
also for proper enforcement of the law.
Conversely, financially-disciplined and tax-compliant institutions
and households facilitate fiscal and monetary responsibility.
The institution of currency boards provides an instructive
illustration of the complementarity of macro and micro aspects of
transition. As we have pointed out several (mostly small)William Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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transition countries, like Bulgaria and Estonia, have adopted
currency boards or equivalent arrangements fixing the exchange
rate in the country’s constitution. These arrangements have been
reasonably effective in establishing monetary stability. But a
precondition for their feasibility has been a minimum degree of
microeconomic enforcement and political stability. Russia, for
example, never introduced a currency board, and most economists
recommended against doing so arguing that the commitment may not
be sustainable given that contracts were not enforced and the
financial sector was fundamentally weak. Bulgaria did introduce a
currency board after severe macroeconomic instability and has
achieved some moderate success, but so far the microeconomic
institutions have been too weak to generate significant positive
results. In the Baltics, Estonia in particular, the micro
foundations were right, and the currency board arrangement has
been a success.
Fiscal and monetary irresponsibility and lack of enforcement
emanate from the same underlying political weaknesses. We have
argued that the legitimacy of governments and their accountability
to the electorate are essential preconditions. Accountability to
the outside world through international agreements can also play
an important role in helping governments achieve fiscal and
monetary restraint. In this respect the European Union has played
an important role in providing outside anchors for the financial
and economic development of transition countries. The accession
process has removed domestic political constraints in theWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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transition countries of central and eastern Europe. The pressure
to meet the criteria for EU membership was essential for the
adoption and enforcement of laws and regulations, and for building
the basic financial infrastructure. Perhaps even more importantly,
the widely shared aspiration to "rejoin Europe" has given strong
direction to, and strengthened the commitment of, the governments
of these countries. Providing such anchors for the countries that
have not yet succeeded in crossing the Great Divide remains a
major challenge for the future.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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Table 1: Domestic credit to households and enterprises over GDP (%)
Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Czech Rep. 51.8 55.3 55.5 60.0 61.5 56.1
Estonia 7.3 11.1 12.5 15.1 20.0 24.4 26.4
Hungary 28.7 24.7 22.3 20.8 21.4 22.7 23.4
Latvia 14.7 11.8 7.0 8.5 12.3 15.7
Lithuania 13.4 14.0 11.5 9.4 10.6 12.3
Poland 10.2 10.5 10.7 13.0 15.6 17.4 20.6
Slovenia 23,1 27,5 28,8 28,6 32,8 35,9
Bulgaria 4.1 3.1 10.6 19.0 15.6 11.4 13.2
Romania 8.3 9.0 9.1
Russia 6.8 7.9 7.0 7.7 10.6 10.2
Slovakia 25.8 24.3 28.4 36.1 41.7 39.8
Ukraine 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.3 1.8 4.8 7.6
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics
Table 2: EBRD Index of Banking Reform (1991-1999)
Country 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
C z e c h  R e p . 23333333 3 +
E s t o n i a 123333 3 + 3 + 4 -
Hungary 223333444
L a t v i a 12233332 -3
Lithuania 112233333
P o l a n d 2233333 3 + 3 +
S l o v e n i a 12333333 3 +
B u l g a r i a 12 -22223 - 3 - 3 -
R o m a n i a 1112333 - 2 + 3 -
R u s s i a 111222 2 + 22 -
S l o v a k i a 23 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -
U k r a i n e 111122222
Note: Index is in the scale from 1 to 4+. 1 stands for little progress beyond establishment of two-tier
system. 4+ stands for standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: full
convergence of banking laws and regulations with BIS standards; provision of full set of competitive
banking services.
Sources: Various EBRD Transition ReportsWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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Table 3: EBRD Index of reforms of non-banking financial institutions (1991-1999)
Country 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Czech Rep. 1 1 2 3- 3- 3- 3- 3 3
E s t o n i a 112 - 2 - 2 -2333
Hungary 222233 3 + 3 + 3 +
L a t v i a 111222 2 + 2 + 2 +
Lithuania 1 1 2- 2 2 2 2+ 2+ 3-
P o l a n d 222233 3 + 3 + 3 +
Slovenia 2 2 2 3- 3- 3- 3- 3- 3-
B u l g a r i a 111122222
R o m a n i a 111222222
Russia 1 1 2- 2- 2 3 3 2- 2-
Slovakia 1 1 2 3- 3- 3- 2+ 2+ 2+
U k r a i n e 12 - 2 - 2 -22222
Note: Index is in the scale from 1 to 4+. 1 stands for little progress. 4+ stands for standards and
performance norms of advanced industrial economies: full convergence of securities norms and
regulations with IOSCO standards; fully developed non-bank intermediation.
Sources: Various EBRD Transition ReportsWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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Table 4: Indicators of the Development of Banking Sector
Country Concentra
tion

















Czech Rep. 74,9 42 23,2 31,4 4,2
Estonia 84,5 7 7,9 3,1 4,5
Hungary 67,4 39 9,1 2,8 3,4
Latvia 53,1 23 8.5
4 6.3
4 9,2
Lithuania 69,7 13 41,9 11,9 8,2
Poland 42,3 77 25.0 14,5 5,8





Romania 85,0 34 50,3 36,6
Russia 53,7 2376 41.9
4 13,1 26,0
Slovakia 84,5 25 50,7 40.0 6,7
Ukraine 64,4 161 12,5 3,3 34,3
Notes:
1 - Defined as the ratio of three largest banks’ assets to total banking
sector assets.
2 - Loan rate is defined as the average rate charged by commercial banks on
outstanding short term credits to enterprises and individuals, weighted by
loan amounts. Weighted average of credits of all maturity is used for Czech
Rep., Lithuania and Ukraine. For Poland only minimum risk loans are
considered. Deposit rate is defined as the average rate offered by commercial
banks on short term deposits, weighted by deposit amounts. Weighted average of
deposits of all maturity is used for Czech Rep., Estonia, Lithuania and
Ukraine.
3 -Data for 1997.
4 -Data for 1998.
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics, IMF Staff Country report Nr.00/59, WB Database on
Financial Development and Structure, EBRD Transition Report 2000William Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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Table 5: Number of companies listed on the stock market
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
         ( M a r c h )
Czech Rep. 1024 1635 1588 276 261 164 154
Estonia 0 0 0 22 26 25 23
Hungary 40 42 45 49 55 66 65
Latvia 0 17 34 50 69 70 64
Lithuania 13 357 460 607 60 54 54
Poland 44 65 83 143 198 221 221
S l o v e n i a 2 51 72 12 62 82 83 4
Bulgaria 16 26 15 15 998 828 842
Romania 4 7 17 76 5753 5825 5578
Russia 72 170 73 208 237 207 218
Slovakia 19 21 816 872 837 845 843
Ukraine 0 96 99 102 113 117 120
Sources: Emerging Markets Fact book, International Finance Corporation,
Claessens, S., S. Djankov and D. Klingebiel, 2000, “Stock Markets in Transition Economies,” The World
Bank, Financial Sector Discussion Paper 5.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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Note: Pre-transition data taken from Keane, M., and E. Prasad, “Inequalities, Transfers and Growth: New
Evidence from the Economic Transition in Poland,” IMF Working Paper 00/177, June 2000. Post-
transition data refers to 1997, except for Russia – 1998, Ukraine – 1996, Bulgaria – 1996 and Estonia –
1995.
Sources: EBRD Transition Report 2000, World Bank World Development Indicators 2000, Keane, M.,
and E. Prasad, “Inequalities, Transfers and Growth: New Evidence from the Economic Transition in
Poland,” IMF Working Paper 00/177, June 2000.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 414
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